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Non-technical summary 
In this working paper we analyse bank screening with regard to the use of hard and soft 
information. We are interested in differences in the effect of an external credit rating on the 
use of bank finance, the share of bank to total finance and bank difficulties between newly 
founded firms in High-Tech vs. Low-Tech industries. We analyse the effect of different 
rating classes, as well as the availability of a rating. Further we examine whether the effect of 
bank characteristics differ between High-Tech and Low-Tech firms. In particular, we look at 
the effects of bank size as a proxy for the bank’s hierarchal structure and the bank’s expertise 
and specialization in the firms industry.  
We employ the KfW/ZEW start-up panel dataset covering 9,715 firms established in the 
years 2005-2009. The panel tracks firms over the period 2007-2009 and we can make use of 
up to three consecutive firm observations. Each firm is assigned with its credit rating 
provided by Creditreform. Each firm is linked with the characteristics of its main bank. 
Our results also suggest that banks rely less on external rating information in their 
decision making for High-Tech firms. The availability of a credit rating hampers access to 
bank finance only when the rating is bad. Firms without rating or with a fair or good rating 
have similar access to bank finance suggesting that banks only employ negative signals from 
credit ratings in their decision making. We find an interesting difference between High-Tech 
and Low-Tech firms as our results seem to indicate that a bad rating is less harmful in terms 
of bank finance for firms in the High-Tech sector than in the Low-Tech sector. 
The size of a firm’s main bank also determines whether start-ups face difficulties in 
obtaining bank finance. Our results suggest that firms that have their main relation with a 
larger bank use less bank finance and report more difficulties in getting credit. By contrast, a 
larger expertise of the bank in the firm’s industry is not associated with fewer difficulties to 
get bank loans. Bank expertise affects the bank share but there is no evidence on difficulties. 
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Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung 
In diesem Arbeitspapier untersuchen wir die Verwendung von harten und weichen 
Informationen in der Kreditentscheidung von Banken an junge Unternehmen. Das 
Forschungsinteresse liegt darin, ob sich der Effekt eines negativen Ratings in der 
Bankfinanzierung von Unternehmen in Hightech von Lowtech-Sektoren unterscheidet. Die 
Effekte werden in Bezug auf die Nutzung von Bankmitteln, den Anteil der Bankmittel am 
gesamten Finanzierungsvolumen und die Schwierigkeiten bei einer Bankfinanzierung 
untersucht. Des Weiteren wird analysiert, ob sich der Einfluss von Bankcharakteristika auf 
die Nutzung von Bankmitteln zwischen Hightech und Lowtech Unternehmen unterscheidet. 
Hier betrachten wir die Bankgröße als Maß für die Hierarchie der Bank und die Expertise der 
Bank in der Industrie des Unternehmens. 
Wir verwenden das KfW/ZEW Gründungspanel und beobachten die Finanzierungsstruktur 
für 9.715 Unternehmen, die zwischen 2005 und 2009 gegründet wurden. Jedem Unternehmen 
wird das entsprechende Krediturteil, das von Creditreform zur Verfügung gestellt wird, 
zugewiesen. Zudem wird das Unternehmen mit den Charakteristika seiner Hausbank 
verknüpft.   
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Banken externe Ratings weniger stark im 
Screeningprozess von Hightech Unternehmen einsetzen. Der Kreditzugang wird lediglich 
durch ein schlechtes Rating beeinflusst, wenn es sich um ein Lowtech Unternehmen handelt. 
Auch der Anteil der Bankfinanzierung wird lediglich bei Lowtech Unternehmen negativ 
durch die erstmalige Verfügbarkeit eines negativen Ratings beeinflusst. Schwierigkeiten mit 
einer Bankfinanzierung nehmen mit der Größe der Hausbank zu. Die Schwierigkeiten 
nehmen dabei nicht durch eine Expertise der Bank in der Industrie des Unternehmens ab. 
Allerdings zeigt sich, dass Unternehmen deren Hausbank eine hohe Expertise haben einen 
höheren Anteil an Bankfinanzierung nutzen. 
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Abstract 
 
Start-up firms often face difficulties in raising external funds. Employing a unique panel 
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start-up firms, but that banks rely less on external rating information in their decision making 
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the impact of bank size. 
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1. Introduction 
Newly created firms and in particular high-tech start-ups are the engines of growth in 
many countries. However, start-up firms – low-tech and high-tech – often face difficulties in 
raising the required funds to implement their ideas. Banks are argued to be less willing to 
provide funds to start-ups as these firms lack collateral and are more opaque (see however 
Robb and Robinson (2012) showing that banks are more important in financing start-ups than 
previously thought). Asymmetric information regarding creditworthiness and a lack of 
tangible capital may arguably lead to stronger credit constraints for high-tech start-ups as 
opposed to low-tech start-ups. 
Banks apply a variety of techniques to overcome information asymmetries between 
themselves and their borrowers. First, they engage in relationship banking, producing 
information on their clients through (multiple) interaction with them (Boot 2000). Second, 
they acquire and process external information on borrowers provided by credit bureaus 
(Jappelli and Pagano, 2006).1 Third, they mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard 
through contract design, i.e. by differentiating the maturity, size or collateral conditions of 
loans.2 
We employ a novel dataset – the German KfW/ZEW start-up panel – to study three 
questions. First, we examine whether high-tech start-ups face more difficulties in accessing 
bank credit than low-tech start-ups. Second, we examine how banks’ use of “hard” credit 
bureau information to screen new borrowers affects lending to start-ups, and whether the role 
of credit bureau information in the screening process differs between low-tech and high-tech 
start-ups. Third, we examine how lending to start-up firms is related to the use of “soft” 
information within the bank and internal expertise of the bank. Again we examine whether 
the role of bank-internal information and expertise differs for high-tech start-ups as opposed 
to low-tech start-ups. 
The KfW/ZEW start-up panel provides us with a rich picture of the financing 
decisions and financing problems of start-ups during their first years of existence. The panel 
provides us with a nationally representative sample of start-ups stemming from a bank-based 
                                                 
1 Examples of information sharing institutions in Germany are Schufa (credit bureau focussed on bank-borrower 
and utility-client payments) and Creditreform (credit reference agency focussed on firm-firm payment 
behavior). 
2 Adverse selection can be overcome by offering a range of self-selecting loan contracts to borrowers, which 
may differ e.g. in collateral requirements (Bester 1985), size (Freixas and Laffont 1990), or maturity (Flannery 
1986). Moral hazard due to non-observable actions of borrowers or costly state-verification can also be 
mitigated through collateral requirements (Bester 1985), or repeated short-term lending (Bolton and Sharfstein 
1990). 
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economy (Germany) where banks are important in providing external finance to firms. We 
employ data from the 2008, 2009 and 2010 waves of the panel which cover financing 
information for 9,715 firms over the period 2007-2009.  Of these firms 4,972 are observed 
once, 2,902 are observed twice and 2,309 are observed in all three waves leading us with 
15,000 firm-year observations. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, high-tech start-up firms are 
less likely to use bank finance and face more difficulties in raising bank finance than low-
tech firms. This suggests that firms from industries that exhibit a greater research and 
development intensity employ less bank finance. Second, information provided by an 
external credit bureau does affect access to bank finance for start-ups. Firms with a fair or 
good rating have similar access to bank finance as firms without rating, while firms with a 
bad rating are more likely to have difficulties getting bank credit. We find though that banks 
rely less on external rating information in their decision making for high-tech start-ups 
compared to low-tech start-ups. Third, start-ups that have their main relation with a small 
bank use more bank finance and report less difficulties in getting credit. This finding suggests 
that banks which rely more on “soft information” generated through relationship banking are 
more likely to lend to start-ups. By contrast, a larger expertise of the bank in the firm’s 
industry is not associated with fewer difficulties to get bank loans. We find no differences, in 
the impact of bank size on high-tech as opposed to low-tech start-ups. 
Our results have important policy implications. Recent bank capital regulations 
introduce a more prominent role for external credit ratings about firms. Policy makers might 
be concerned that financiers of innovative firms start to rely too much on credit ratings 
provided by credit bureaus. We find that this concern is unwarranted as banks seem to rely 
less on external ratings in their loan decision making for high-tech firms than for low-tech 
firms. In particular, a bad rating obtained by a high-tech firm is less harmful for its bank 
funding than a negative rating for a low-tech firm. The bigger reliance on credit bureaus 
therefore does not seem to require any specific policy intervention regarding high-tech firms. 
Our results do further suggest that the trend towards more concentration in the banking sector 
may have detrimental impacts on credit availability for start-up firms. We find that start-ups 
which use larger banks indeed face more difficulties in obtaining bank finance. However, this 
result applies for all types of start-ups – low-tech and high-tech – suggesting that policy 
intervention for innovative firms is unwarranted. 
Our paper contributes to three current strands of literature in the field of 
entrepreneurship and financial intermediation: (i) the financing of start-ups, (ii) the impact of 
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credit information sharing on credit assessment and credit availability, and (iii) the relation 
between bank organization and lending technology.  
Young and innovative firms differ in several dimensions from established firms, and 
are especially prone to financial constraints. In addition to a high degree of uncertainty 
associated with the output of innovative investment, the entrepreneur or inventor is better 
informed than investors about the nature of the project and the likelihood of success (Hall 
2009). This implies that the lender-firm relationship is more exposed to adverse selection and 
moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) for start-ups with innovative investments than for 
those with traditional investment or established firms. Firms can mitigate financing problems 
by offering collateral (Bester 1985, Harhoff and Körting 1998) or building up reputation 
developed through repeated interactions (Boot 2000). Innovative firms may have difficulties 
providing collateral since most R&D expenditures consists of worker wages and salaries and 
the assets created are intangible and idiosyncratic and therefore have a low salvage value 
(Hall 2009). Lerner (1995) and Gompers and Lerner (1996) stress that, compared to venture 
capitalists, banks face more difficulties in monitoring firms with few tangible assets. Recent 
evidence on start-ups financial structure shows that banks are the main supplier of external 
funds to small and young businesses both in Europe and in the US. In the specific case of 
high tech firms, outside equity such as venture capital, plays in general a more important role 
than debt (Bozkaya and Pottelsberghe 2008). Due to lack of data, one key aspect missing in 
the recent empirical literature is the relation between start-ups credit availability and the 
characteristics of banks. We find that start-ups financed by larger banks face more financial 
difficulties whereas start-ups dealing with banks with a greater expertise in an industry do not 
seem to relax credit constraints.  
Second, our paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on the role of 
information sharing for the functioning of credit markets. Theory suggests that sharing of 
information among creditors can reduce adverse selection (Pagano and Jappelli 1993) and 
entrepreneurial moral hazard (Padilla and Pagano 1997) in bank-borrower relationships. 
Several recent empirical studies employing micro datasets, cross-country datasets, and 
experiments have demonstrated that credit information sharing is beneficial to credit market 
performance. Credit scoring models based on credit agency data suggests that the use of 
credit reports allows lenders to more accurately predict loan defaults (Kallberg and Udell, 
2003). Also, credit information sharing improves firm’s repayment performance (Doblas-
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Madrid and Minetti 2009).3 There is scarce evidence to date on how credit information 
sharing affects credit availability for start-up firms. This is, however, an important issue. If 
banks rely strongly on credit history information for their credit assessment, this may have a 
negative impact on those prospective borrowers which do not have a (bank-) credit history. 
Start-up firms typically lack a history of bank-credit. However, the entrepreneur may have a 
personal credit history and after an initial phase the firm may have a history of paying utility 
and supplier bills. This information may be particularly valuable for a bank’s credit 
assessment when it deals with innovative start-ups for which information asymmetries are 
particularly strong. Using data from the Kauffman survey in the US, Cerqueiro and Penas 
(2010) and Robb and Robinson (2010) find that information on payment behavior (or the 
absence of it) does affect access to credit for start-up firms. We contribute to this literature by 
comparing the impact of credit bureau information on access to credit for high-tech as 
opposed to low-tech firms. Our results suggest that this role may indeed be weaker for 
innovative firms. 
Third, there is a large theoretical and empirical literature showing that banks with 
different organizational structure use different types of information in their credit assessment 
and rely on different contractual terms to mitigate information asymmetries. Stein (2002) 
argues that in large, hierarchical banks the incentives of a loan officer to acquire "soft" 
information about his clients are muted, as this information cannot be verifiably documented 
to the officer's superiors who approve loan applications. As a consequence large hierarchical 
banks will be less likely to invest in screening and monitoring, and thus to lend to financially 
opaque firms. Empirical work has employed different strategies to identify the impact of bank 
organization on the employed lending technology. Berger et al. (2005a, 2005b) for example 
start from the presumption that large banks are more hierarchical. They show that smaller 
SMEs borrow from smaller banks and that while smaller banks do increasingly use credit 
scoring methods, they still have stronger relationships with their borrowers. Others have more 
direct proxies for hierarchy by employing the number of decision layers within a bank.4 
Liberti and Mian (2009) find that greater hierarchical distance between the information 
collecting agent and the hierarchical unit that decides on loans leads to less reliance on 
                                                 
3 Recent experimental results indicate that information sharing disciplines borrowers to repay their loans (Brown 
and Zehnder, 2007). Cross-country evidence, supports the conjecture that information sharing improves credit 
availability at the aggregate level (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007) and the 
firm level (Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2009). 
4 Liberti (2005), for example, studies how changes in a bank’s organizational structure affect the incentives of 
account managers to collect soft information and to employ it in the pricing of loans. He finds that account 
managers who receive more authority are more inclined to collect and use soft information. 
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subjective information and more on objective information. Degryse, Laeven and Ongena 
(2009) find that more hierarchical banks specialize more in transparent firms and employ a 
more uniform loan pricing strategy. We contribute to this literature by investigating how bank 
size and expertise impacts on credit constraints of start-up firms and whether this impact 
varies for high-tech as opposed to low-tech firms. Our results suggest that start-up firms- both 
low-tech and high-tech face less credit constraints when their main bank is small. We do not 
find such an effect for bank expertise.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and 
our methodology. Section 3 describes the results of our empirical analysis using the 
KfW/ZEW start-up panel. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data & Methodology 
Our analysis is based on the three initial waves (2008, 2009 and 2010) of the KfW/ZEW 
Start-up panel. This survey contains information on the financing, economic activity and 
ownership of start-up firms in Germany5. The survey includes subsequent waves allowing to 
investigate the development of newly founded firms over time.  
 
Panel Structure 
The sample consists of 9,715 firms among which 4,972 are observed once, 2,902 are 
observed twice and 2,309 are observed in all three waves (see Table 1, panel A). This yields a 
total of 15,000 firm-year observations (see Table 1, panel B). Note that in the initial 2008 
wave, firms which started operations in either 2005, 2006 or 2007 were surveyed. This 
implies that with our three waves of data, our dataset includes firms ageing one to five years. 
Financing information is only provided for the year of observation. Therefore, financing 
information in the firm’s initial year is not given for those with delayed entry into the Start-up 
Panel.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows that 39% of all observations are for High-Tech firms. We 
distinguish between High-Tech firms and Low-Tech firms defined according to average 
                                                 
5 The survey oversamples start-ups in High-Tech industries and firms which receive subsidized funding from the 
German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). KFW is a business development bank at the federal level in 
Germany which is government owned and was initiated to promote Germany at home as well as abroad. In 
addition to the provision of subsidized loans the KfW also manages subsidies assigned by the federal 
employment agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). For robustness checks all regressions are estimated without 
firms stratified based on their KfW characteristic.   
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expenditures on research and development (R&D) per industry. In particular, High-Tech 
firms are active in industries with average R&D expenditures exceeding 12% of annual sales. 
Low-Tech firms are active in industries with average R&D expenditures below this 
threshold.6 
Table 1. Structure of the KfW/ZEW- Start-up Panel 
Panel A and Panel B report the number of observations by year of observation and the firms' year of 
foundation. The year of observation (2007,2008,2009)  is the year prior to each survey wave 
(2008,2009,2010).  Financial information is provided for the year of observation. 
Panel A. Firm observations
                
     Year of foundation 
Years of observation  Total  2005 2006 2007 2008  2009
2007, 2008, 2009   2,309  766 845 698 0  0
2007, 2008, ‐‐‐‐  1,108  332 409 367 0  0
‐‐‐‐, 2008, 2009  1326  0 127 306 893  0
2007, ‐‐‐‐ , 2009  468  160 164 144 0  0
2007, ‐‐‐‐ , ‐‐‐‐  1,559  516 524 519 0  0
‐‐‐‐, 2008,‐‐‐‐  853  0 101 211 541  0
‐‐‐‐, ‐‐‐‐, 2009  2,092  0 0 186 396  1,510
Total  9,715  1,774 2,170 2,431 1,830  1,510
Panel B. Firm-year observations
      Year of foundation 
Year of observation  Total  2005 2006 2007 2008  2009
2007  5,185  1,682 1,850 1,653 0  0
2008  4,907  1,043 1,355 1,391 1,118  0
2009  4,908  752 908 1,062 1,006  1,180
Total  15,000  3,477 4,113 4,106 2,124  1,180
High‐Tech share  0.39  0.40 0.40 0.38 0.39  0.38
 
                                                 
6 We choose to classify firm innovativeness according to industry-level R&D activity rather than firm-level 
in order to mitigate issues of endogeneity of R&D to bank finance. However, using information on firm-level 
R&D from the ZEW/KfW Start-up Panel to classify firms as innovative (have at least one full-time employee 
engaged in R&D) versus non-innovative (no full-time employee engaged in R&D) yields similar patterns of 
bank finance as presented in Panel C of Table 2.   
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Bank Finance 
We employ three dependent variables, each capturing different aspects of firm financing 
using banks. Bank use is a dummy which is 1 for all firms that use bank finance for working 
capital or new investment in a particular year. Bank share is the share of working capital and 
new investment financed by banks in a particular year. The other sources of external 
financing are start-up grants for previous unemployed entrepreneurs by the federal 
employment agency, loans provided by family members or friends, mezzanine capital, and 
external equity7. Both Bank use and Bank share are measures of the usage of bank finance. 
Finally, Bank difficulties is a dummy variable which equals one when a firm states that it had 
difficulties in getting bank finance for working capital or new investment in a given year. We 
interpret this variable as an inverse measure of credit availability. Table 2 presents summary 
statistics for our three dependent variables. Panel A suggests that in 26 percent of the firm-
years, firms use bank finance with an average share of bank finance to total finance of 9 
percent. Also, firms report difficulties in accessing bank finance in around 15% of the firm-
years.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports sample means for our dependent variables by firm age. 
Interestingly, the share of firms which use bank finance declines over time from 35 percent in 
the first year to 24 percent in the 5th year. This decline may be driven by lower needs for new 
investment and the ability to finance working capital with retained earnings after the initial 
start-up phase. However, it may also be driven by attrition. Firms which require external 
finance may be less likely to survive the initial start-up phase and thus disappear from the 
survey. To control for demand and attrition effects, the right hand side of Panel B reports the 
means of our three dependent variables only for the subsample of firms which Require 
external finance. We define these firms as those which either use external finance (bank 
finance or other sources of external financing) and/or firms which report difficulties in 
accessing external finance. The data presented in Panel B suggests that once we control for 
attrition and the demand for external finance, the use of bank finance hardly changes over 
time. In their first year of existence, 66 percent of firms that require external finance use bank 
finance, while among the five-year-old firms 68 percent do so. The share of bank finance to 
total finance also remains fairly stable over time for firms that demand external finance, 
while the share of firms reporting difficulties in accessing bank finance increases with firm 
age. Panel B also reports the use of other sources of external finance by firm age. We learn 
                                                 
7 External equity either is Private Equity, Venture Capital, capital from business angels or capital from shares 
sold to others. Details of other sources of external financing for our sample of firms are provided in Appendix 1. 
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that the federal employment agency is most important in the first year and considerably drops 
thereafter. The other sources remain fairly stable in firm age. 
Table 2. Indicators of bank finance 
Panel A presents the summary statistics of the dependent variables.  Panel B presents mean values by firm age. 
Panel C presents mean values by  statistics related to industry classification which is based on the firm's product 
with the largest sales potential. A list of the industry coding is provided in the Appendix.  In Panel B and Panel 
C we report means for all firms in the dataset, as well as  for a subsample of firms seeking external finance. The 
later is restricted to  firms that either use external finance and / or  stated difficulties in accessing external 
finance. 
Panel A - Summary statistics
  
Firm‐year 
obs. 
mean  median min max
Definition  Source
Bank use  15,000  0.26  0 0 1 1 if firm uses bank loan or 
overdraft; 0 otherwise 
SuP
Bank share  12,104  0.09  0 0 1 Ratio of bank finance to total 
financing volume 
SuP
Bank 
difficulties 
14,988  0.15  0 0 1 1 if firm reports difficulties 
accessing bank finance; 0 
otherwise 
SuP
 Panel B - Mean values by firm age and demand for external finance 
   All firms  Firms seeking external finance 
Firm age in 
years  1  2  3 4 5 1 2 3  4  5
Bank use  0.35  0.25  0.21 0.21 0.24 0.66 0.65 0.64  0.64  0.68
Bank share  0.13  0.08  0.07 0.07 0.10 0.24 0.21 0.20  0.20  0.25
Bank 
difficulties 
0.17  0.14  0.14 0.15 0.16 0.32 0.37 0.42  0.44  0.46
Firm‐year 
observations 
3,951  4,247  4,099 1,951 752 2,115 1,625 1,366  645  268
 
Panel C - Mean values by industry and demand for external finance 
      
   All firms Firms seeking external finance
  
All 
industries 
Low‐tech High‐Tech All 
industries
Low‐tech  High‐Tech
Bank use  0.26  0.30 0.19 0.65 0.69  0.57
Bank share  0.09  0.11 0.06 0.22 0.24  0.17
Bank difficulties  0.15  0.16 0.14 0.38 0.36  0.41
Firm‐year observations  15,000  9,129 5,871 6,019 4,015  2,004
 
In Panel C of Table 2 we report summary statistics of our dependent variables for Low-
Tech and High-Tech firms separately. Means are presented for all firms as well for the 
subsample of firms which seek external finance. Focusing on the latter subsample of firms, 
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Panel C shows that there is a marked difference in access to bank finance between High-Tech 
and Low-Tech firms. Considering only those firms that require external finance we find that 
69 percent of Low-Tech firms report that they use bank finance while only 57 percent of 
High-Tech firms do so. The Bank Share of total firm financing is 24 percent for Low-Tech 
firms compared to 17 percent for High-Tech firms. Finally, 41 percent of High-Tech firms 
report Bank difficulties in accessing bank finance, while only 36 percent of Low-Tech firms 
do so.8 
 
External credit rating 
We match the data from the ZEW/KfW Start-up Panel with information provided by the 
credit bureau Creditreform to yield external credit rating information for each firm. 
Creditreform is the biggest database on German companies with more than 3.6 million 
entries. It is the leading source of information on creditworthiness of small firms. While 
Germany has also a public credit registry organized by the Bundesbank, it contains only 
information on large exposures (more than €1.5 million), a threshold largely exceeding the 
loans to start-up firms. From the Creditreform database we extract for each firm and each 
year an indicator of whether an external credit rating is provided for the firm, and if so, how 
the firm is rated. Similar to the credit scores provided e.g. by Dun & Bradstreet, the score 
provided by Creditreform is based on past payment behavior on trade credit from suppliers as 
well as utilities. The information on payment behavior is enhanced with a subjective 
assessment by Creditreform of the firm’s future capability to honor credit relations. The latter 
assessment is provided by the analyst investigating the firm. It is based on the full set of 
information regarding the firm including e.g. order situation.  As illustrated in Table 3, Panel 
A, each firm is rated on a scale of 1 to 6. In line with the classification by Creditreform we 
code the rating classes 1 (advise against a business relation), 2 (Business relation is a matter 
of trust) and 3 (Business relation at discretion) as Bad rating. Rating class 4 (Business 
relation approvable) is coded as Fair rating, while classes 5 (Business relation approved) and 
6 (Business relation supported) are coded as Good rating.  
Table 3, Panel B reports the frequency by firm age of the availability of a credit rating 
and the rating type – no rating, bad, fair and good. As past payment behavior on trade credit 
and utilities is a key element of the credit rating, it is not surprising that only a minority of 
                                                 
8 By contrast to bank finance Appendix 1 shows that High-Tech firms are more likely to use external equity 
(11%) and mezzanine capital (3%) than Low-Tech firms (4% and 1% respectively).  
 
 10 
 
firms (1.7 percent) are rated in their first year of existence. The data suggests that the 
assignment of a credit rating in the first year of existence is endogenous to firm payment 
behavior: Ratings assigned in the first year of existence are much more likely to be bad 
ratings (17.6%) than ratings assigned later. The share of rated firms increases fast between 
the age of two and four years, so that among four year old firms only 9% have no rating.  
 
Table 3. Credit Rating 
Panel A reports the classification. Panel B reports the availability  of credit 
ratings and the distribution of credit ratings for those firms which have a credit 
rating by firm age. 
     
Panel A. Rating classification
     
Rating class  Classification  Code 
1  Advise against a business relation. 
Ba
d 2  Business relation is a matter of trust. 
3  Business relation is discretionary. 
4  Business relation is approvable.  Fai
r 
5  Business relation approved. 
Go
od
 
6  Business relation supported. 
     
Panel B. Availability and type of credit rating
     
  
Rating 
available (%) 
Frequeny of rating if available (%) 
Firm age  Bad Fair Good 
1  1.7 17.6 44.7 37.1 
2  28.8 8.0 57.4 34.6 
3  70.4 4.6 54.3 41.1 
4  90.6 4.8 53.5 41.7 
5  94.6 5.5 52.6 41.9 
Total  44.4 5.5 54.4 40.1 
 
Size and expertise of main bank 
The Creditreform database also provides information on the main bank relation of each 
firm. Creditreform gathers information on bank-firm relationships from firm letterheads, 
invoices and financial statements. We classify each firm’s main bank according to the size of 
that bank and how focused the lending of that bank is in the firm’s industry. As our dataset 
does not provide us with information on the total loan portfolio of each bank we approximate 
Bank size by the total labor force employed by all firms the bank serves as a main bank. We 
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use two measures to capture the industry focus of the firm’s main bank. The variable Bank 
expertise captures the total number of firms in the same industry which the bank serves as a 
main bank. The rationale behind this indicator is that the expertise of the bank with respect to 
underwriting loans in a particular industry is related to the absolute number of loans it makes 
in this industry. The variable Bank specialization measures the share of the bank’s activities 
which are in the firm’s industry. As we do not have information on bank loan portfolios we 
use the total labor force of firms served by the bank in the industry relative to the total labor 
force of all firms served by the bank as our measure of specialization of the bank in that 
industry. Thus while Bank expertise measures the absolute expertise of the bank in an 
industry, the variable Bank specialization is a measure of relative specialization in a 
particular industry.  
For each firm we not only have information on the main bank but also the corresponding 
bank branch is identified. We therefore are in a position to measure Bank size, Bank expertise 
and Bank specialization at the national, state or regional level. Motivated by the conjecture 
that in large, nationwide German banks credit decisions are made at either branch, regional or 
state level, but hardly at the national level, we calculate all three indicators at the state level.9 
Table 4, Panel A, provides definitions and summary statistics for all our key explanatory 
variables. 
 
Control variables 
In our multivariate analysis we control for a range of firm characteristics which may 
affect a firm’s access to bank finance. Table 4, Panel B, presents definitions and summary 
statistics for all control variables. We control for Firm age, and firm size (Sales, number of 
Employees). With respect to firm governance, we control for whether there is a Management 
team or a sole manager, the firm is a Limited company or not, whether at least one manager is 
a Master craftsman or not, whether at least one manager has a University degree, as well as 
the Entrepreneurial experience of the management. With respect to firm financing, we 
control for whether the firm has Private equity investment10, and whether the firm or the 
owner has Real estate (which could be used as collateral). We control for whether the firm is 
a Manufacturing or alternatively a service firm in order to account for different demand for 
                                                 
9 Nationwide banks are split at the bank-clearing level 2 of the German Bundesbank which roughly corresponds 
to the state level. 
10 Private equity is a dummy variable which is 1 if the firm has private equity in any year within our observation 
period. We also run (unreported) regressions dropping private equity as explanatory variable, or including 
lagged private equity. Results are robust to these alterations. 
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credit and availability of tangible pledgeable assets. We further control for the riskiness of the 
business with the industry-level Exit rate and the district-level Unemployment rate in each 
year. Finally we include year dummies (for 2007 and 2008, with 2009 as reference) to 
account for country-wide level changes in access to finance during the crisis.  
 
Table 4. Explanatory variables 
This table presents definitions, sources and summary statistics for our explanatory variables, with the main 
explanatory variables presented in Panel A and control variables presented in Panel B. Data sources are either 
the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel (SuP), Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP), or Bank Panel (BP). Bank size, Bank 
expertise and Bank specialization are based on firm-bank relationships, whereby nationwide banks are split 
roughly at the State level (bank-clearing level 2 according to the German Bundesbank).  
        
Panel A. Main explanatory variables 
       
   Obs  Mean  Median  Min Max Definition  Source
 Innovation 
High‐tech  15,000  0.39  0  0 1 1 if firm is in a High‐Tech industry; 0 
otherwise 
SuP
Rating 
No rating  15,000  0.56  1  0 1 1 if credit rating is not available in 
January of the year of observation; 0 
otherwise 
MUP
Bad rating  15,000  0.02  0  0 1 1 if rating category equals 1 to 3; 0 
otherwise 
MUP
Fair rating  15,000  0.24  0  0 1 1 if rating category equals 4; 0 otherwise  MUP
Good  rating  15,000  0.18  0  0 1 1 if rating category equals 5 or 6; 0 
otherwise 
MUP
Bank characteristics 
Bank size  11,836  113,719  30,854  10 1,704,219 Total labor force of firms with the same 
main bank relationship. 
BP 
and 
MUP
Bank 
expertise 
11,836  9,414  2,197  2 366,984 Number of firms with the same main 
bank relation and the same industry 
coding. 
BP 
and 
MUP
Bank 
specialisation 
11,836  0.12  0.10  0.00 0.80 Total labor force of firms with the same 
main bank relation and the same 
industry coding divided by total labor 
force of firms with the same main bank 
relation. 
BP 
and 
MUP
 
Methodology 
Our first hypothesis is that banks are less likely to condition credit decisions on external 
credit ratings when they are dealing with High-Tech as opposed to Low-Tech firms. To test 
this hypothesis we first examine the pooled cross-sectional model [1]. In this model ܤܨ௜,௝,௧ is 
an indicator of access to bank finance for firm i in industry j and for year t. As explanatory 
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variables we employ year specific intercepts ߙ௧, indicators of credit rating ܥܴ௜,௧ as well as 
firm-level, industry-level and district-level controls  ܨ௜,௧. Our main interest in this model is on 
the coefficients ߚଶ which capture whether credit ratings have a differential impact on credit 
availability for the subsample of High-Tech (HT) as opposed to the subsample of Low-Tech 
firms. 
[1] ܤܨ௜,௝,௧ ൌ 	ߙ௧ ൅ ߚଵ ∙ ܥܴ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ ܪ ௜ܶ ∙ ܥܴ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷ ∙ ܨ௜,௧ ൅ ߳௜,௝,௧   
 
Model [1] does not take advantage of the panel dimension of our data to control for time-
invariant heterogeneity across firms. We complement model [1] with a panel analysis that 
focuses on those firms which received their initial credit rating at the age of 2-4 years.11 
Among these firms we compare those firms which initially received a Bad rating as opposed 
to those firms that received a Fair rating or a Good rating. As captured by the interaction 
term ܪ ௜ܶ ∗ ܥܴ௜,௧ in model [2] we examine whether among initially rated firms the difference 
in the share of bank loans to total finance across rating classes differs for High-Tech as 
opposed to Low-Tech firms.  
[2] ∆ܤܽ݊݇	ݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ߚଵ ∙ ܥܴ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ ܪ ௜ܶ ∗ ܥܴ௜,௧ ൅ ߳௜,௧  
for firms with ܥܴ௧ିଵ ൌ missing 
 
Our second hypothesis is that the bank with which the firm has its main bank relationship 
is more important in determining the access to finance for High-Tech as opposed to Low-
Tech firms. Both Bank size and industry focus (Bank expertise, Bank specialization) may 
play a role. Berger et al. (2005) for example employ bank size as proxy for organizational 
complexity. Larger banks are more hierarchically organized and therefore may rely less on 
soft information in their decision making (Stein (2002)). These negative impacts of bank size 
are expected to be more relevant for high-tech sectors as these require more soft information 
in loan granting decisions. Expertise or relative specialization in a particular industry may 
                                                 
11 As displayed in Table 3 over 95% of firms receive their first rating in this period. We exclude firms which 
receive their initial rating already in their first year of existence as well as those that are not rated until their fifth 
year in order to mitigate selection effects. 
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alleviate financing constraints. We conjecture that expertise or specialization is more 
important for High-tech firms as opposed to Low-Tech firms. 
We examine the impact of the main bank relationship on credit access for High-Tech as 
opposed to Low-Tech firms with the pooled cross-sectional model [3]. Again,  ܤܨ௜,௝,௧ is an 
indicator of access to bank finance for firm i in industry j and for year t. As explanatory 
variables we employ year specific intercepts ߙ௧, indicators of the main bank relationship of 
the firm ܤܴ௜ as well as firm-level, industry-level and district-level controls  ܨ௜,௧. Our main 
focus of interest in this model is again on establishing whether the coefficients ߚଶ capture 
differential impacts of bank relationships for the subsample of High-Tech as opposed to the 
subsample of Low-Tech firms. 
 
[3] ܤܨ௜,௝,௧ ൌ 	ߙ௧ ൅ ߚଵ ∙ ܤܴ௜ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ ܪ ௜ܶ ∙ ܤܴ௜ ൅ ߚଷ ∙ ܨ௜,௧ ൅ ߳௜,௝,௧    
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3. Results 
Tables 5-8 present the results of our multivariate analysis. In tables (5-7) we report results 
for all firms as well as for the subsample of firms that seek external finance, while in table 8 
we report results only for the subsample of firms that seek external finance. By excluding 
those firms that do not require external financing for investment or operations we try to 
disentangle supply side effects from demand side drivers of the use of bank finance. 
However, because there are other sources of external finance, results reported for bank 
finance (i.e., Bank use and Bank share) may also be driven by demand. Therefore, we only 
conclude that there is a credit availability effect when we find significant results in the 
regression for Bank difficulties. 
 
Firm innovation and bank finance 
Table 5 presents pooled cross-sectional estimates examining the relation between firm-
characteristics and access to bank finance. For each of our three dependent variables Bank 
use, Bank share and Bank difficulties we present two specifications: Columns (1-3) present 
results for all firms while columns (4-6) present results for the subsample of firms that seek 
external finance. The table reports OLS estimates for each specification, with standard errors 
clustered at the firm level reported in parentheses. Therefore the results for the dummy 
variables Bank use and Bank difficulties should be interpreted within the context of a linear 
probability model. 
The Table 5 results suggest that High-Tech firms are less likely to use bank finance and 
are more likely to experience difficulties in accessing bank finance than Low-Tech firms. The 
coefficient of the dummy variable High-Tech in columns (1-2) suggests that considering the 
full sample of firms High-Tech firms are 9.4 percentage points less likely to use bank finance 
than Low-Tech firms and have on average a share of bank finance that is 4.7 percentage 
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points lower. The results reported in columns (4-5) for the subsample of firms which seek 
external finance show a slightly larger difference between High-Tech and Low-Tech firms. 
The column (6) results show further that, among those firms that seek external finance, High-
Tech firms are 5 percentage points more likely to report difficulties in getting bank finance 
than Low-Tech firms. Table 2 shows that among the firms that seek external finance, 65% 
use bank finance, the average bank share of external financing is 22% and the share of firms 
that report difficulties getting bank finance is 38%. Compared to these sample averages the 
estimated differences between High-Tech and Low-Tech firms are not only statistically, but 
also economically significant.  
 
Focusing on the column (4-6) estimates, the results on Firm age suggest firms are less 
likely to use bank finance and more likely to experience difficulties in getting bank finance as 
they grow older, while High-Tech firms are also more likely to experience difficulties as they 
become older. Larger firms (Employees, Sales) are more likely to use bank finance. Limited 
liable companies use less bank finance and are more likely to face difficulties getting bank 
finance. Private equity investment is associated with lower shares of bank financing, but also 
with less difficulties in getting bank finance. This confirmed our conjecture that firms which 
receive private equity funding are less reliant on bank finance. Firms with better educated 
managers, i.e. Master craftsman and University degree are more likely to use bank credit and 
less likely to experience difficulties getting bank finance.  Prior experience of the 
entrepreneur (Experience) is associated with less access to bank finance. The latter variable 
may capture the effect of the manager having failed previous ventures. Finally, entrepreneurs 
who own real estate, and thus have collateral to post, are more likely to use bank finance. 
However, the availability of such outside collateral does not seem to diminish the likelihood 
of facing difficulties in getting bank finance. 
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Table 5. Innovation and bank finance: Cross-sectional estimates 
All standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. See Tables 2 and 4 for definitions of 
all variables. 
Firms  All firms  Firms seeking external finance 
Dependent variable  Bank use  Bank share Bank difficulties Bank use Bank share  Bank difficulties
Industry  HT  & LT  HT  & LT HT  & LT HT  & LT HT  & LT  HT  & LT
Model  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
High‐Tech    ‐0.094***    ‐0.047*** ‐0.011   ‐0.109***   ‐0.067***     0.048***
                                         (0.01)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02)
Firm age                            ‐0.057***    ‐0.024***   ‐0.011***   ‐0.016***   ‐0.014***     0.047***
                                         (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.01)
Management team       0.016     0.009*   ‐0.002 0.012 0.013  ‐0.017
                                         (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02)
Employees                         0.006***     0.003***    0.001**     0.004***    0.003***  ‐0.001
                                         (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
Limited company            ‐0.050***    ‐0.014***    0.025***   ‐0.068*** ‐0.012     0.091***
                                         (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02)
Sales                              0.004***  0.001    0.002***    0.006*** 0.001  0.002
                                         (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
Private equity            0.215***     0.029***    0.108***   ‐0.052*     ‐0.072***    ‐0.104***
                                         (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03)
Master craftsman            0.041***     0.014**    ‐0.024***    0.090***    0.034***    ‐0.062***
                                         (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02)
University degree  ‐0.002  0.001   ‐0.026***    0.040**  0.015    ‐0.042** 
(0.01)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02)
Experience                     ‐0.047***    ‐0.030***    0.054***   ‐0.086***   ‐0.050***     0.133***
                                         (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02)
Real estate                        0.031**      0.019**  0.006    0.039*      0.038**   ‐0.012
                                         (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03)
Manufacturing     0.042***     0.020***    0.030*** 0.013    0.016*   0.012
                                         (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02)
Exit rate                       ‐0.091***    ‐0.049***   ‐0.062*** ‐0.015   ‐0.031***    ‐0.072***
(0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02)
Unemployment             ‐0.005***    ‐0.002*** 0.001   ‐0.011***   ‐0.005***  0.002
                                         (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
Year 2007                         ‐0.052***    ‐0.049***   ‐0.020***   ‐0.051***   ‐0.081***  ‐0.023
                                         (0.01)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)
Year 2008                       0  ‐0.001    0.003**  ‐0.004   ‐0.003**      0.006** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
Constant     0.441***     0.202***    0.133***    0.761***    0.351***     0.199***
  (0.03)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.04)
Observations                 15000  12105 15994 6019 5015  6113
Method  OLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS  OLS
log likelihood                 ‐8468.76  1897.6 ‐5907.86 ‐3942.41 ‐656.09  ‐4152.39
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Considering the estimates in columns (1-3) Manufacturing firms seem to use more bank 
finance than service firms, but are also likely to experience difficulties in getting bank 
finance. However, these results seem to be driven by differences in credit demand across 
industries: Considering only those firms that seek external finance the estimates in columns 
(4-6) suggest similar access to bank credit for Manufacturing and service orientated firms.  
 
 
Credit rating and bank finance 
Table 6 presents our estimations of Equation (1) in which we examine the relation 
between the external credit rating of firms and their use and access to bank finance. We run 
three specifications, one for each of our three dependent variables. We do this again for the 
full sample of firms (columns 1-3) as well as for the firms seeking external finance (columns 
4-6). We report OLS estimates for all coefficients, with clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. 
In all specifications the variables of interest are the dummy variables No rating, Bad 
rating, Fair rating and Good rating, and the interaction terms of High-Tech with the rating 
dummies. The reference group in all specifications are Low-Tech firms without a credit 
rating. All models include a full set of firm-level control variables, interactions of High-Tech 
with the firm controls and year dummies. For expositional reasons the estimates of the 
control variables are not presented in the table.  
The results presented in Table 6 suggest that Low-Tech firms which have a Bad rating are 
less likely to use bank finance, and are more likely to experience difficulties in getting bank 
finance than firms with either a Good rating, Fair rating, or No rating (the omitted category). 
The effect is economically important as shown in columns 4-6 for the subsample of firms 
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which seek external finance. A Low-Tech firm with a bad rating is 25.7 percentage points 
less likely to use bank finance and 31 percentage points more likely to face bank difficulties 
than a Low-Tech firm with no rating. Tests for equality of the coefficients No rating, Fair 
Rating and Good rating also suggest that in the Low-Tech industry there is no difference in 
access to finance between firms which have no, fair or good ratings. Similar tests show that 
the same pattern holds for High-Tech firms. Thus among the start-up firms in our sample it 
appears that firms without a credit rating are treated as if they have a good or fair rating. This 
behavior by banks seems very reasonable given that at most 5% of the firms actually do get a 
bad credit rating, when they are rated (Table 3, Panel B).  
Table 6. Credit rating and bank finance: Cross-sectional estimates 
All models include a fulls set of firm-level control variables and year dummies. All standard errors clustered by 
firms are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. See Tables 2 and 4 for definitions of all variables. 
Firms  All firms  Firms seeking external finance 
Dependent variable  Bank use  Bank share Bank difficulties Bank use Bank share  Bank difficulties
Industry  HT  & LT  HT  & LT HT  & LT HT  & LT HT  & LT  HT  & LT
Model  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Bad rating                       ‐0.072**   ‐0.012    0.162***   ‐0.257***   ‐0.062**      0.310***
                                        (0.03)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.05)
Fair rating                     ‐0.008  0.002 0.013 ‐0.006 0.008     0.050*  
                                        (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03)
Good rating                  0.011  0.009 0.015 ‐0.003 0.012  0.035
                                        (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03)
HT* No rating  ‐0.048    ‐0.049*   0.043 0.004 0  0.084
                                        (0.05)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06)  (0.10)
HT* Bad rating  ‐0.002  ‐0.018 ‐0.036 0.022 0.052  ‐0.134
                                        (0.07)  (0.04) (0.07) (0.13) (0.08)  (0.14)
HT* Fair rating  ‐0.049  ‐0.051 0.022 ‐0.019 ‐0.016  0.01
                                        (0.06)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07)  (0.11)
HT* Good rating  ‐0.073    ‐0.057*   0.02 0.001 0.016  0.042
                                        (0.06)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07)  (0.11)
Observations                15000  12105 15994 6019 5015  6113
Firm controls  yes  yes yes yes yes  yes
Firm controls * HT   yes  yes yes yes yes  yes
Year dummies  yes  yes yes yes yes  yes
Method  OLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS  OLS
log likelihood                ‐7945.58  2249.77 ‐5859.97 ‐3623.28 ‐482.49  ‐4081.02
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Contrary to our predictions, none of the interaction terms between High-Tech and the 
rating variables is significant, suggesting that the impact of the same credit rating on firm 
access to bank finance does not differ between High-Tech and Low-Tech firms.  
The specifications in Table 6 do not take advantage of the panel structure of our data that 
can allow us to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. So in Table 7 we perform 
differences-of-means tests of the changes in Bank share after obtaining a credit rating 
between Low-Tech and High-Tech firms. We do this for the three credit rating possibilities: 
when rated for the first time the firm can receive a bad rating, fair rating or good rating. We 
focus on those firms that received their first credit rating at the age of two, three or four years. 
As shown in Table 3, over 95 percent of firms receive their first rating during these years. We 
exclude firms which receive their initial rating already in their first year of existence as well 
as those that are not rated until their fifth year in order to mitigate selection effects. 
Table 7 shows that, when considering all firms (whether seeking external finance or not), 
a bad rating decreases Bank share by 8% in the case of Low-Tech firms, while the effect for 
High-Tech firms is close to zero. Importantly, the difference between the two groups is 
statistically significant. When restricting the sample to those firms that seek external finance, 
the magnitudes and signs of the effects are similar though now the difference is not 
significant, probably due to the lower number of observations and thus less statistical power. 
These results seem to indicate that a bad rating is less harmful in terms of bank finance for 
firms in the High-Tech sector than in the Low-Tech sector. Banks seem to rely less on 
external rating information in their decision making for High-Tech firms.  
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Table 7. Credit rating and Bank Finance: Panel analysis 
This table presents the effect of a credit rating becoming available on Bank share. In this analysis only firms of 2,3 or 4 years age are considered for which 
in the previous year no rating was available. The figures present the mean change in Bank share from year t-1 to year t. Asterix indicate whether the 
reported mean values are significantly different for firms which received Bad vs. Fair, Fair vs. Good or Bad vs. Good ratings at the * 0.1, ** 0.5, or *** 
0.01 level of significance. 
                   
   All firms  Firms which require external finance 
     
Industry    
Bad rating Fair rating Good rating Bad ‐
Fair 
Fair ‐
Good 
Bad ‐ 
Good 
Bad rating Fair rating Good 
rating 
Bad ‐
Fair 
Fair ‐
Good 
Bad ‐ 
Good 
         (1) (2) (3) (1)‐(2) (2)‐(3) (1)‐(3)  (4) (5) (6) (4)‐(5) (5)‐(6) (4)‐(6) 
Low‐Tech                                           
∆ Bank share  [1]  ‐0.080  ‐0.016  ‐0.007  **  **  ‐0.055  0.061  0.078  *  * 
  obs.     44  451  277           17  180  120          
High‐Tech             
∆ Bank share  [2]  0.016  ‐0.012  0.004     0.037  0.068  0.091 
obs.     22  301  232     10  99  71 
∆HT ‐ ∆LT [2]‐
[1]       0.096  0.004  0.011           0.092  0.006  0.012          
        **                                  
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Main bank- relationship and bank finance  
Table 8 presents our estimations of Equation (3) in which we examine the impact of the 
main bank-relationship of firms and their access to bank finance. We study two main bank 
characteristics: bank size and bank industry focus. Bank size is the total labor force of firms 
the bank serves as a main bank. We measure bank industry focus in two different ways. Bank 
expertise is the total number of firms in the same industry the bank serves as a main bank. 
Bank specialization measures the share of the bank’s activities which are in the firm’s 
industry. As we do not have information on the bank loan portfolios we use the total labor 
force of firms served by the bank in the industry, relative to the total labor force of all firms 
served by the bank.  
For each of our three dependent variables Bank use, Bank share and Bank difficulties we 
present two specifications: Columns (1-3) present results that include Bank size and Bank 
expertise as main bank characteristics, while columns (4-6) present results that replace Bank 
expertise by Bank specialization as a measure of bank focus. We report OLS estimates for 
each specification, with standard errors clustered at the firm level reported in parentheses. 
Therefore the results for the dummy variables Bank use and Bank difficulties should again be 
interpreted within the context of a linear probability model. 
All specifications suggest that firms that have their main relation with a larger bank use 
less bank finance and report more difficulties in getting credit. This is the case both for Low-
Tech firms and High-Tech firms. The point estimate in columns (4-6) suggest that a one 
standard deviation increase in bank size (202,370) from the mean (113,719) would increase 
Bank use by 1.6 percentage points, Bank share by 0.8 percentage points, and reduce Bank 
difficulties by 1.1 percentage points. These effects are relatively small compared to the mean 
values of Bank use (65%), Bank share (22%) and Bank difficulties (38%) among those firms 
that seek external finance.  
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Results in columns 2 and 5 show that a larger expertise of the bank in the firm’s industry - 
measured either by absolute Bank expertise or relative Bank specialization - is associated 
with a larger share of bank finance. However, better knowledge of the industry does not seem 
to significantly reduce difficulties in getting credit (see columns 3, 6).  
 
Table 8. Bank relationship and bank finance 
All models include a full set of control variables, interaction terms between High tech and firm control variables 
as well as year dummies. All standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
       
Firms  Firms which require external finance 
Dependent variable 
Bank use  Bank share Bank 
difficulties
Bank use Bank share  Bank 
difficulties
Industry  HT  & LT  HT  & LT HT  & LT HT  & LT HT  & LT  HT  & LT
Model  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Bank size (log)    ‐0.021*     ‐0.019***    0.021*     ‐0.016***   ‐0.008**      0.011*  
                                            (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.01)
Bank expertise (log)  0.006     0.013*   ‐0.011
                                            (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)
Bank specialization    0.001    0.001**   ‐0.001
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
High‐Tech                             0.157  ‐0.054 ‐0.125    0.234*   0.068  0.016
                                            (0.16)  (0.09) (0.16) (0.14) (0.09)  (0.15)
HT * Bank size (log)  ‐0.011     0.018*      0.036*     ‐0.022**  ‐0.001  0.01
                                            (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)
HT * Bank expertise (log)   ‐0.015    ‐0.023**  ‐0.033
                                            (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02)
HT * Bank specialization    ‐0.004   ‐0.004***  0.003
                                              (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
Constant                               0.835***     0.441*** 0.08    0.809***    0.345***  0.139
                                            (0.08)  (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05)  (0.09)
Observations                        4839  4022 4911 4839 4022  4911
Firm controls  yes  yes yes yes yes  yes
Firm controls * HT   yes  yes yes yes yes  yes
Year dummies  yes  yes yes yes yes  yes
Method  OLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS  OLS
log likelihood                        ‐2900.97  ‐419.64 ‐3289.82 ‐2900.51 ‐416.05  ‐3295.37
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Contrary to our expectations we do not find a robust stronger impact of Bank size, Bank 
expertise or Bank specialization on the use or access to bank credit for High-tech firms. The 
positive coefficient for the interaction term High-tech * Bank size in column (3) suggests that 
High-tech may face more difficulties in getting bank credit as opposed to Low-tech firms 
when they bank with a large bank. However, this result is not confirmed in column (6). 
Robustness tests 
 In the data section we mentioned that the ZEW/KfW panel oversamples start-ups that 
were stratified based on their KfW characteristics (see Fryges, Gottschalk, and Kohn (2010) 
for details). The KfW supports firms with promotional financial means like loans, equity and 
mezzanine capital, or grants. Because banks could behave differently when faced with firms 
that receive those subsidies, we check the robustness of our results by running all regressions 
in Table 5, 6, 7 and 8 excluding the KfW firms. All our results survive after dropping those 
observations with the exception of the one that pointed to High-Tech firms being more likely 
to have bank difficulties than Low-Tech firms (see Table 5). This effect disappears when we 
limit our sample to firms not supported by KfW, while High-Tech firms are still significantly 
different from Low-Tech firms in terms of use of bank finance. These findings suggest that 
among firms not supported by KfW although High-Tech firms use less bank finance than 
Low-Tech firms, this difference may be mostly demand-driven. 
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4. Conclusions 
This paper employs a unique dataset on German start-ups to study how banks screen 
start-ups in low-tech and high-tech sectors. We study whether the availability of external 
information – such as a credit rating granted by a credit bureau – impacts bank-credit 
availability and whether such a credit rating has differential impacts for High-Tech firms 
versus Low-Tech firms. Furthermore we investigate how the size of the firm’s main bank 
influences a start-up’s credit availability and whether a bank’s focus and expertise has a 
differential role for low-tech and high-tech firms. These are important questions as start-ups 
are an important engine of economic growth and High-Tech firms may not have the 
necessary sources available to realize an economy’s potential. 
 We find that high-tech start-up firms are less likely to use bank finance and face more 
difficulties in raising bank finance than Low-Tech firms. This suggests that firms from 
industries that exhibit a greater research and development intensity employ less bank finance. 
Our results also suggest that banks rely less on external rating information in their 
decision making for High-Tech firms. The availability of a credit rating hampers access to 
bank finance only when the rating is bad. Firms without rating or with a fair or good rating 
have similar access to bank finance suggesting that banks only employ negative signals from 
credit ratings in their decision making. We find an interesting difference between high-tech 
and low-tech firms as our results seem to indicate that a bad rating is less harmful in terms of 
bank finance for firms in the High-Tech sector than in the Low-Tech sector. 
The size of a firm’s main bank also determines whether start-ups face difficulties in 
obtaining bank finance. Our results suggest that firms that have their main relation with a 
larger bank use less bank finance and report more difficulties in getting credit. By contrast, a 
larger expertise of the bank in the firm’s industry is not associated with fewer difficulties to 
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get bank loans. We find no robust evidence that the impact of bank size is more pronounced 
for High-tech firms as opposed to Low-tech firms. 
Our results have important policy implications. Policy makers might be concerned 
that financiers of innovative firms rely too much on credit ratings provided by credit bureaus. 
We find that this concern is unwarranted as banks seem to rely less on external ratings in 
their loan decision making for high-tech firms than for low-tech firms. Also, the trend 
towards more concentration in the banking sector may have detrimental impacts on credit 
availability for firms where loans are based upon soft information. We find that start-ups 
employing larger banks indeed face more difficulties in obtaining bank finance. However, 
this result applies for all types of start-ups – low-tech and high-tech – suggesting that a 
differential policy intervention for innovative firms is unwarranted. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A-1. Explanatory variables 
This table presents definitions, sources and summary statistics for our explanatory variables, with the main 
explanatory variables presented in Panel A and control variables presented in Panel B. Data sources are either 
the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel (SuP), Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP), Bank Panel (BP), or Statistical Office 
(SO). Bank size, Bank expertise and Bank specialization are based on firm-bank relationships, whereby 
nationwide banks are split roughly at the State level (bank-clearing level 2 according to the German 
Bundesbank).  
Panel B. Control variables 
       
   Obs  Mean  Median  Min Max Definition Source
Firm age  15000  2.42  2  1 5 1 – 5 years  SuP
Management 
team 
15000  0.29  0  0 1 1 if firm is managed by two or more; 0 
otherwise 
SuP
Employees  15000  3.99  2  0 255 Number of full‐time equivalent employees  SuP
Limited 
company 
15000  0.30  0  0 1 1 if firm is a limited liable company.  SuP
Sales  15000  330  80  0 160000 Total sales in previous year in 1,000 EUR  SuP
Private Equity  15000  0.04  0  0 1 1 if external equity or mezzanine capital was 
used (any time); 0 otherwise 
SuP
Master 
craftsman 
15000  0.24  0  0 1 1 if at least one manager holds a master 
craftsman certificate; 0 otherwise 
SuP
University 
degree 
15000  0.41  0  0 1 1 if at least one team member holds a 
university degree; 0 otherwise 
SuP
Experience  15000  0.08  0  0 1 1 if the manager either had sold a previous 
business, has another business or is a 
restarter; 0 otherwise 
SuP
Real estate  15000  0.08  0  0 1 1 if the firm or manager owns a private and 
or business property; 0 otherwise 
MUP
Manufacturing  15000  0.33  0  0 1 1 if firm is in a manufacturing industry; 0 
otherwise 
SuP
Exit rate  15000  11.1  11.2  1.6 19.1 Share per industry (Nace 3 digit level) of 
firms that failed within 3 years after start‐up 
MUP
Unemployment  15000  6.6  5.9  1.4 18.3 Rate of unemployment in the firms district 
in the particular year 
SO
Year 2007  15000  0.35  0  0 1 1 if year of observation is 2007; 0 otherwise  SuP
Year 2008  15000  0.33  0  0 1 1 if year of observation is 2008; 0 otherwise  SuP
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Table A-2. Other sources of external finance 
Panel A presents the summary statistics of the further financing sources.  In panel B the left columns entitled 
"All firms" contain all observations available for the empirical analysis. The right columns entitled "Firms 
desired external finance" restrict observations t those firms that either used external finance and / or  stated 
financial difficulties seeking external finance. Panel B presents the summary statistics related to the firms' age. 
Panel C presents summary statistics related to industry or innovation classification to firms seeking external 
finance only. Firms industry classification is related to the product with the largest sales potential. 
Panel A - Summary statistics
  
No. of 
firm‐
years
mean  median min max
Definition  Source
Federal 
employment 
agency 
14,996 0.09  0 0 1 1 if either at least one team member 
received a start‐up grant by the 
federal employment agency (the 
grant covers the amount of 
unemployment benefit and social 
security costs);  0 otherwise 
SuP
Federal 
employment 
agency share1 
1,087 0.13  0.08 0 1 Volume of start‐up grant finance to 
total financing volume 
SuP
Family and 
friends 
14,998 0.06  0 0 1 1 if either loan from family members 
or friends is used; 0 otherwise 
SuP
Family and 
friends share1 
746 0.17  0.10 0 1 Volume of loans by family members 
and friends to total financing volume 
SuP
External equity  14,999 0.03  0 0 1 1 if either Private Equity, Venture 
Capital, capital by business angels 
were used of shares were sold; 0 
otherwise  
SuP
External equity 
share1 
289 0.31  0.20 0 1 Volume of external equity to total 
financing volume 
SuP
Mezzanine 
capital 
14,999 0.01  0 0 1 1 if mezzanine capital is used; 0 
otherwise 
SuP
Mezzanine 
capital share1 
80 0.29  0.19 0 1 Volume of mezzanine capital to total 
financing volume 
SuP
External finance 
desired 
15,000 0.40  0 0 1 1 if either the firm used or reported 
difficulities with at least one of the 
above mentioned sources of external 
finance; 0 otherwise   
SuP
1 Shares are reported only for those firms that used the particular source of finance.
 
Panel B - Mean values by industry (only firms seeking external finance) 
   All Low‐tech High‐Tech
Federal employment agency  0.22 0.25 0.17
Family and friends  0.16 0.17 0.13
External equity  0.06 0.04 0.11
Mezzanine capital  0.02 0.01 0.03
No. of firm‐years  6,019 4,015 2,004
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Table A-3. Credit rating and volume of bank finance: Panel analysis 
This table presents the effect of rating availability on the volume of bank finance (in thousand EURO). In this analysis only firms are considered for which in 
the previous rating no rating was available. The figures present the mean. Asterix indicate whether the reported mean values are significantly different for 
firms which received Bad vs. Fair, Fair vs. Good or Bad vs. Good ratings at the * 0.1, ** 0.5, or *** 0.01 level of significance. 
 
                   
  
All firms
 Firms which require external finance
     in the year rating information is available
    
  
Bad 
rating 
Fair 
rating 
Good 
rating 
Bad - 
Fair 
Fair - 
Good 
Bad - 
Good
Bad rating Fair 
rating 
Good 
rating 
Bad - 
Fair 
Fair - 
Good
Bad - 
Good 
     (1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3) (4) (5) (6) (4)-(5) (5)-(6) (4)-(6) 
All         
Age = 2, 3 or 4 delta   -11.201 -17.037 -4.352 * -7.836 -4.341 2.028
obs   93 1040 723   35 367 267
                       
Low-Tech       
Age = 2, 3 or 4 delta [1] -14.429 -26.986 1.183   -6.069 -15.963 13.612 * 
obs   62 636 403   21 239 164
                       
High-Tech       
Age = 2, 3 or 4 delta [2] -4.746 -1.431 -11.322   -10.486 17.340 -16.416 * 
obs   31 402 320   14 127 103
      
HT- LT [2]-[1]     9.682 25.556 -12.505       -4.417 33.302 -30.028       
      ** *        *        
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Table A-4. Credit rating and loans by family and friends: Panel analysis 
This table presents the effect of rating availability on the share of loans provided by family members or friends to total financing volume. In this analysis only 
firms are considered for which in the previous rating no rating was available. The figures present the mean. Asterix indicate whether the reported mean values 
are significantly different for firms which received Bad vs. Fair, Fair vs. Good or Bad vs. Good ratings at the * 0.1, ** 0.5, or *** 0.01 level of significance. 
                   
  All firms Firms which require external finance
     in the year rating information is available
    
  
Bad 
rating 
Fair 
rating 
Good 
rating 
Bad - 
Fair 
Fair - 
Good 
Bad - 
Good
Bad rating Fair 
rating 
Good 
rating 
Bad - 
Fair 
Fair - 
Good
Bad - 
Good 
     (1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3) (4) (5) (6) (4)-(5) (5)-(6) (4)-(6) 
All         
Age = 2, 3 or 4 delta   -0.009 0.002 0.003 * -0.005 0.016 0.013
obs   66 750 508   27 277 191
                       
Low-Tech       
Age = 2, 3 or 4 delta [1] -0.009 0.000 0.005   0.005 0.012 0.021
obs   44 448 277   17 178 120
                       
High-Tech       
Age = 2, 3 or 4 delta [2] -0.010 0.006 -0.001   -0.022 0.024 0.000 ** 
obs   22 300 231   10 98 71
      
HT- LT [2]-[1]     -0.001 0.006 -0.006       -0.027 0.011 -0.021       
                *       
 
